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21 Introduction
The presence of self-organisation in economic systems is one of the earliest features identified
in economic thought. This phenomenon, referred to initially as the “invisible hand” by Adam
Smith, then as “spontaneous order” following the work of Hayek (1945), is now often referred to
as “emergence” by the agent-based computational economic literature, for instance in Tesfatsion
(2006). Two common elements in all three of these interpretations are the notion that (a) economic
mechanisms are not planned ex ante but appear as the result of interactions between agents, and
(b) these mechanisms maintain the organisation of economic activity over time. To some extent,
this is analogous to the Schro¨dinger (1967) definition of living organisms as entities able to maintain
or increase their internal order, thus maintaining or reducing their internal entropy.
This paper argues that a consequence of such self-organisation is that under the right conditions,
the evolution over time of economic systems should be predictable by signal restoration algorithms.
The intuition for this is simple: signal restoration algorithms are designed to reconstruct signals
that have been degraded by noise or by distortion. The standard interpretation of this, in a system
where entropy (i.e. disorder) increases with time is that the non-degraded signal existed in the
past. However, in a self-organising system, the arrow of time is reversed and the non-degraded
signal exists in the future. In practical terms, the paper establishes this result by obtaining a
strong formal statement relating to self-organisation in allocation problems, and then illustrates it
by using Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) signal restoration to successfully predict the evolution of a
simple self-organising agent-based model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The conceptual structure of the argument and
the various strands of literature required to obtain it are first detailed in section 2, and section 3
explains how the use of MaxEnt in signal restoration is related to its existing use in economics.
Section 4 then shows the equivalence of allocation problems and congestion games under reasonable
assumptions on preferences, opening up the use of signal restoration algorithms due to the presence
of systematic improvement paths. This possibility is then illustrated in section 5 by applying
MaxEnt to the Schelling model of segregation. Section 6 discusses the implications of these findings
and concludes.
2 Review of the relevant literature
The main contribution of the paper is that as a consequence of the self-organising nature of
economic systems, signal restoration algorithms, which are normally designed to retrieve the past
3states of physical systems, can be used instead to look into the future. Several distinct strands
of literature are combined to demonstrate this concept both theoretically and with a practical
application.
The first strand is taken from the extensive economics and operational research literature on
object allocation, initiated amongst others by Hurwicz (1973), Harris and Raviv (1981) or Myerson
(1981). The specific type of allocation problem used in the paper is based on the knapsack problem,
which is a well known combinatorial optimisation problem where one has a set of objects with given
values and weights and the objective is to pick the combination of objects with the highest value,
without exceeding fixed a weight limit, i.e. the capacity of the knapsack. The specific variant used
here is the multichoice multi-dimensional knapsack problem (MMKP), in which several groups
of objects are available, with each object providing a specific value and requiring a particular
subset of several distinct sets of resources. The objective is to pick a single object from each
of the groups, maximising their aggregate value while ensuring the multi-dimensional resource
constraint is met. As will be show in section 4.1, this offers enough flexibility to model a very
general economic allocation problem. In fact, the MMKP has already been used in the operational
research literature to model problems such as the allocation of nurses with different skills and
time preferences to different types of shifts (Dowsland and Thompson, 2000), or the allocation
of distinct computing resources such as memory and CPU cycles to several networked users with
different session preferences (Khan et al, 2002).
In contrast to the object allocation literature, however, the aim of modelling object allocation
with the MMKP is not to provide a practical solution to or an optimal design for the general
allocation problem, but rather to establish an important property relating to self-organisation.
This is achieved by showing that the MMKP allocation problem is related to the literature on
congestion and potential games. Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal (1973) as a
way of modelling resource allocation on a network, with Rosenthal’s initial example of road users
attempting to select routes so as to minimise the congestion they experience providing the name
to this class of games. The paper then relies on the fundamental result provided by Monderer and
Shapely (1996), who prove that every congestion game is isomorphic to a potential game, where
a single potential function encodes all the payoffs of the game. This in turn ensures the existence
of the finite improvement property (FIP), which implies that every initial condition is linked to
a Nash equilibrium by a finite number of improvement steps. As will be shown in section 4, this
chain of reasoning allows us to make a strong statement of self-organisation for general allocation
problems.
4A third important strand of literature used in the paper relates to the use of the MaxEnt
metodology both in existing economic research and in signal restoration literature. Because the
MaxEnt method forms the base of the proposed algorithm, the formal relation between the two
approaches is detailed separately in section 3, however it is important to point out the track-
record that MaxEnt already possess in economic theory. Versions of this methodology have been
used by Foley (1994) and Toda (2010) to prove the existence of a statistical market equilibrium
when agents have offer sets of transactions they are willing to accept and meet in a random
fashion. Applied investigations using the MaxEnt methodology include Castaldi and Milakovic´
(2007), which investigates the distribution of wealth using information on turnover in portfolios and
Alfarano and Milakovic´ (2008) which similarly explored the origin of the Laplace distribution of firm
growth rates. A second important reason for choosing the MaxEnt signal restoration algorithm is
that because it uses Shannon (1948) information entropy as its objective function, it offers a natural
information-theoretical intuition of why signal restoration in the presence of self-organisation is in
fact a prediction on the future, in keeping with the Schro¨dinger (1967) definition of self-organisation
mentioned above.
Finally, as stated in the introduction, a practical demonstration of the methodology is provided
by applying the proposed methodology to the Schelling (1969, 1971) model of segregation. The
model is chosen because of its simplicity,1 and crucially because the literature establishes that its
strong self-organisation is underpinned by presence of a potential function. Indeed, in the physical
analog to the Schelling model proposed by Vinkovic and Kirman (2006), particles on a lattice
systematically rearrange themselves to reduce the internal energy of their configuration, and the
overall energy of the system provides the potential function. Very recent analysis of the model by
Grauwin et al (2012) confirms that it possess a potential function for continuous neighbourhoods
under some parameterisations. The existence of the a potential function for the Schelling model
ensures the presence of the FIP, making it ideally suited as a test bed for illustrating the theoretical
argument proposed in the paper.
3 Maximum entropy as a Bayesian signal restoration method
The use of MaxEnt as a signal restoration methodology is formally equivalent to its use in the
economics literature, with two main differences that will be explained below. The first is that the
methodology has an explicitly Bayesian setting, with maximum entropy being used to assign priors
1 Marks (2007) shows that the functional complexity of the Schelling model is relatively low, with most of it coming
from the random initial condition. This makes the model a desirable benchmark, as the proposed methodology is
useless if it cannot function on even the simplest cases.
5for a degenerate maximisation. The second is that the entropy function used for signal restoration
is more general and thus offers more flexibility than the one used in the literature mentioned above.
As an illustration, let us assumed that a message made up of N characters, each one drawn from
an alphabet of length C is transmitted to an observer over a noisy channel. This general structure
encompasses a wide range of possible messages, such a string of N letters, intensities in a N -pixel
image, or some data measurements for N agents, etc. As a result of the noisy transmission channel,
the data d received by the observer will be different from the original message. Supposing that the
observer wishes to identify the best possible reconstruction of the signal h from the imperfect data
d, a reasonable criterion for doing so is to maximise the posterior probability of h being the true
signal given the data available, i.e. arg maxh p (h|d). Bayes’ rule states that this posterior can be
expressed as the product of a prior on h and the likelihood p(d|h), normalised by the evidence p(d):
p (h|d) = p (h) p (d|h)
p (d)
(1)
As is standard with Bayesian methods, rewriting using the log-likelihood `(d|h), simplifies the
maximisation of the posterior with respect to h to:
arg max
h
p (h|d)⇔ arg max
h
[p (h) exp (−` (d|h))] (2)
At this point one might think that solving (2) is a matter of maximising the likelihood, effectively
leaving aside the prior probability of the hypothesis p(h). However, in this case, because h and d
have the same size and the same support, there are as many ‘parameters’ to determine in h as
there are ‘data points’ in d. As a result the maximisation problem is degenerate and the choice of
prior will have a strong effect on the prediction. The central tenet of MaxEnt is that in such cases,
the prior probability of a hypothetical distribution h should be exponentially proportional to the





Here α is a regularisation parameter and S (h) is the Shannon (1948) information entropy of
the candidate reconstruction h. Using i ∈ N to index locations in the message and c ∈ C to
index characters in the alphabet, the following information entropy measures the uncertainty of
the observer as to the content of a proposed reconstruction h:








6The justification for this, provided by Jaynes (1957) and Foley (1994), is that S (h) is in fact
the logarithm of the multiplicity of h, i.e the number of ways the distribution can be realised. This
implies that the prior probability (3) of a candidate reconstruction h is simply proportional to its
multiplicity. This allows the methodology to be “maximally noncomittal with regard to missing
information” (Jaynes, 1957, p. 623). A formal proof of this is provided by Shore and Johnson
(1980), who prove that it is the only method of selecting priors that satisfies three key axioms: the
prior leads to a unique prediction; it is independent of the coordinate system used; and it does not
depend on whether information about independent systems or sub-systems is accounted for jointly
or separately.
In practice, the observer often has knowledge of a pre-existing structure in the message or
of some properties of the noise process in the transmission. The observer’s uncertainty about h,
which (4) measures in absolute terms, must therefore be corrected so that it is measured relative
to this pre-existing knowledge, modeled by m. This is achieved by using the following relative
entropy, which is equal to minus the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence from m to h, and measures
the similarity between two distributions.2 It reaches a global maximum of zero for m = h and is
strictly negative for m 6= h.









In the case where m is a uninformative uniform distribution, the two forms of entropy (4) and
(5) are equivalent in a maximisation problem. This corresponds to a situation where the observer
has no useful prior knowledge about the possible reconstructions, and measuring uncertainty in
absolute terms is equivalent to measuring it relative to an uninformative m.
Given the entropic prior (3) and relative entropy (5), the posterior probability (1) can now be
expressed as:
p (h|d) = exp (αS (h|m)− ` (d|h))
p (d)ZSZ`
(6)
One can see from (6) that identifying the candidate distribution h with the highest a posterior
probability involves maximising the information entropy of h subject to a set of constraints provided
by the observations received in d:
arg max
h
p (h|d)⇔ arg max
h
(αS (h|m)− ` (d|h))
2 Formally, the KL divergence measures how many bits of information are gained by learning that the true
distribution is h rather than m. As explained by Cover and Thomas (1991) it is often used as a measure of the
distance between two distributions, and its additive inverse is therefore a measure of similarity.












If one assumes a uniform value for m, this structure nests the existing approaches of Foley





i − Nd recovers the exponential endowment distributions in a pure exchange economy
found by Foley (1994), where c is the individual endowment level and d is the aggregate endow-
ment. The advantage of using relative entropy (5) rather than the Shannon entropy (4) is that it
allows additional flexibility through the integration of a model m, which can incorporate any prior
knowledge of existing structure in the reconstruction h which might be missing from the observed
data d. The usefulness of this extra flexibility when making predictions about economic systems
will be demonstrated when applying the methodology in section 5. We first need to formally show,
however, why it is appropriate to use MaxEnt signal restoration as a prediction methodology in
self-organising economic systems.
4 Finite improvement paths in object allocation
4.1 Object allocation as a knapsack problem
As explained in section 2, we show that the object allocation problem facing the social planner can
be modeled using a MMKP. Formally, there are N agents in the economy, labeled i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
and the social planner has to allocate Q different units amongst those agents. Although this does
not influence the general problem, it will be convenient in the discussion to distinguish K types
of commodities, labeled k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} for which quantities qk ∈ N are available, in which case
Q =
∑
k qk. The allocation problem can be solved, in principle, with the following four steps.
– Step 1: The social planner labels all the possible bundles that can be built with the Q units
available and lists them in a 2Q × Q binary table B, shown in table 1. Each {0, 1} cell of the
table states whether the jth unit is included in the bth bundle or not. The binary string formed
by each row therefore provides not only the corresponding bundle’s composition but also a
unique identifier for the bundle.
– Step 2: The social planner sends the B-table to the N agents who, assuming completeness, rank
the 2Q bundles according to their preferences. The rankings are returned to the social planner
8Table 1 Binary bundle identifiers
B j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 ... j = Q
b = 1 0 0 0 0 ... 0
b = 2 1 0 0 0 ... 0
b = 3 0 1 0 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
b = 2Q 1 1 1 1 ... 1
Table 2 Bundle preference ranking
U i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 ... i = N
b = 1 1 1 1 1 ... 1
b = 2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
b = 2Q 2Q 2Q 2Q 2Q ... 2Q
who then builds a 2Q ×N ranking table U , shown in table 2. Under the usual assumptions of
transitivity and monotonicity, all agents will rank the full bundle highest and the empty bundle
lowest.
– Step 3: The social planner must pick a bundle for each agent, using a 2Q × N choice matrix




Xb,i = 1 ∀i ∈ N .3 The goal of the social planner is to maximise the sum of
the ranks over agents while remaining within the resource constraint. Formally, this can be
expressed as the following MMKP:
max tr (UX ′)
s.t. :B′X1N = 1Q
(8)
Here 1N and 1Q are the N and Q-length unit vectors respectively. Choosing an objective
function for the MMKP is directly related to the problem of choosing a social welfare function.
The standard approach of knapsack problems is to maximise the sum of the values of the objects
chosen, which in this case means maximising the sum of the individual rankings. This choice
is equivalent to a Benthamite social welfare function, where overall social welfare is simply the
sum of individual orderings.4 The constraint ensures that the sum of the binary identifiers for
each selected bundle equals the unit vector, i.e. each unit in Q is selected only once. Expressed
in scalar notation, this corresponds to the standard MMKP as presented by Hifi et al (2004);
Sbihi (2007). The only differences compared to the more general framework in the operational
3 One can see that even if the agent is allocated two bundles a and b from B, then a+ b is also a bundle in B.
4 This use of the term Bethamite as a reference to a simple sum of individual rankings is borrowed from Ng
(1975). This may seem overly simplistic, however given that a utility function is never uniquely defined, it is in
fact possible to modify the choice of social welfare function to some extent within the linear sum framework of the
MMKP by first applying monotonic transformations to the rankings expressed by the agents in table U.
9Table 3 Allocation table
A∗ i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 ... i = N
j = 1 0 0 1 0 ... 0
j = 2 1 0 0 0 ... 0
j = 3 0 1 0 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
j = Q 0 0 0 1 ... 0
research literature is that the resource requirement per bundle in B is the same for all i agents












Bb,jXb,i = 1 ∀j ∈ Q
(9)
– Step 4: Once the optimal choice table X∗ is obtained, the social planner can build a Q × N
allocation table A∗ = B′X∗, shown in table 3. This table uniquely assigns every unit in Q to
an agent in N , and can therefore be used for the purpose of selecting goods one by one and
dispatching them to their allocated owner.
In theory all four steps of the MMKP are feasible and A∗ exists. The problem is not tractable in
practice, however, and one of the main advantages of the framework is that it neatly separates the
types of hurdles facing a social planner. The first is the choice of the correct social welfare function,
followed, as pointed out by Hayek (1945), by a high and potentially unfeasible informational re-
quirement (Step 2) and by a large and computationally complex combinatorial optimisation (Step
3).5 As a result, although it exists, the optimal allocation A∗ is unknown to the social planner. We
now move to proving a strong statement about the emergence of a stable decentralised allocation
in such a system.
4.2 Knapsacks, congestion games and improvement paths
As explained in section 2, the operational research literature has used the MMKP to model resource
allocation on a network, a setting similar to that of the congestion game in Rosenthal (1973). We
now show that the two are in fact equivalent under standard assumptions on preferences, which
has important implications in terms of self-organisation.
The allocation of Q goods over N agents with preferences given by U is modeled as a road
congestion game where qk ∈ N users of K different types have to choose a route i in an N -
5 The knapsack problem is known to be NP-complete, in other words solutions to the problem can be verified




Fig. 1 Multigraph congestion game
edge multigraph between start point s and finish point f , in order to maximise their payoff V kb,i.
Elaborating on Rosenthal (1973), one could imagine that the K different types represent different
categories of vehicles, such as cars, trucks, etc. who each generate different congestion costs. This
choice of graph as, illustrated by Figure 1, implies that distinct routes follow separate edges i.e.
there are no externalities between routes, where the benefit of a user choosing a route might depend
on the number of users choosing another route.
As is standard in congestion games, the payoffs V kb,i for choosing an edge are a function of the
number of users already on the edge. These will be derived from the ranking information returned
in table 2. Specifically, let us define ∆kUb,i = Ub,i−Ub{−k},i as the change in ranks at the margin,
following the addition of the last k-type good to bundle b. In terms of notation, b{−k} is the
bundle obtained by removing a k-type good from bundle b. Similarly, in the following, b{+k} will
refer to the bundle obtained by adding a k-type good to bundle b.6 This allows the derivation of
a 2Q ×N ×K payoff array V which is set as V kb,i = ∆kUb,i.
The following two assumptions on the rankings in the table 2 are required in order to show
equivalence between the MMKP and the congestion game frameworks:
Monotonicity: ∆kUb,i > 0 ∀ k, i, b.
Concavity: Given two bundles a and b, ∀ i ∈ N if Ub,i > Ua,i then ∆kUb,i < ∆kUa,i.
Monotonicity, which was already implicity assumed in the description of the rankings table 2,
ensures that all the congestion game payoffs in V are strictly positive. Concavity intuitively means
that the bundle rankings exhibit decreasing marginal values, as adding extra units of k-type goods
to a bundle, keeping the rest of the bundle constant, will bring successively smaller increases in the
ranking. Together with monotonicity, this is required in order to ensure that the payoff of choosing
a particular edge is decreasing with the number of users on that edge, as in the basic congestion
6 ∆kUb,i is of course undefined for the empty bundle and whenever bundle b contains no k-type units.
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game framework of Rosenthal (1973).7 We now prove that if the rankings table U satisfies these
two assumptions, the MMKP and congestion game formulations are equivalent.
Proposition: If the ranking table U displays monotonicity and concavity, the optimal solution
to the MMKP problem is a Nash equilibrium for the corresponding multigraph congestion game
based on payoff table V.
Proof: By contradiction. Let X∗ be the decision table that satisfies the MMKP (8) and A∗ =
B′X∗ the corresponding allocation of the Q users over the N edges of the multigraph. Let us
assume that A∗ is not a Nash equilibrium for the Q users. If b and a are the bundles allocated to
edges i and x respectively by X∗, this implies:
∃ i, x, k : V ka{+k},x > V kb,i
Let Y be the decision table resulting from the switch of the k-type agent from edge i to x. Y
is identical to X∗, except for edges i and x, which receive bundles b{−k} and a{+k} respectively.
Using the definition of V kb,i:
∆kUa{+k},x > ∆kUb,i
Ua{+k},x + Ub{−k},i > Ua,x + Ub,i





X∗ does not satisfy the MMKP, which is a contradiction. 
Corollary: If the ranking table U displays monotonicity and concavity, the objective function of
the MMKP is an exact potential function for the corresponding multigraph congestion game based
on payoff table V.
Proof: Immediate from the previous proof and the definition of the payoffs V kb,i. The change in
payoff to a k-type user for switching from edge i to x is V ka{+k},x − V kb,i. Given that V kb,i = ∆kUb,i
one has:




The objective function of the MMKP is an exact potential for the congestion game based on
the corresponding V kb,i payoffs. 
7 In the standard framework of Rosenthal (1973), congestion costs on an edge are increasing with the numbers of
users on the edge, and the aim of the network users is to choose the edge with the lowest cost. This is equivalent to
the framework used here, where the benefit of using an edge falls with the numbers of users on the edge, and users
choose the edge with the highest benefit.
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As was shown by Monderer and Shapely (1996) and explained in section 2, the equivalence of
the MMKP and congestion game frameworks and the existence of a potential function implies the
existence of the finite improvement property (FIP). Starting from any initial state a simple myopic
best-response path will lead to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. For the MMKP, an
Edgeworth process where agent pairs meet randomly and trade goods with low marginal utility
∆kUb,i against goods with higher marginal utility would satisfy the requirement, as the potential
function tr(UX ′) would increase following such trades.8 The central implication of this result is
that if the rankings expressed by the N agents are monotonic and concave, then even though
the MMKP cannot be solved centrally, the social planner can be confident that the system will
eventually reach a decentralised allocation.
The existence of a convergence process to a set of decentralised allocations is no surprise and
only duplicates the existing findings of the objet allocation literature mentioned in section 2.
Instead, the result of interest is the presence of the FIP, as this is what underpins the proposed
use of the MaxEnt signal restoration methodology. Indeed, under the FIP any initial state I is
linked to a final Nash equilibrium F by a finite sequence of intermediate states I → F on which
transitions are the result of agents making best-response, welfare-increasing trades. If, however, the
same sequence of states is viewed in reverse, F → I, transitions now reflect a systematic sequence
of random errors. This is because a reverse transition will involve at least one agent moving from
a unique and optimal situation to one of many possible sub-optimal ones. The key consequence of
this is that the initial condition I can be treated as the realisation of a particular noise process
applied to F . The implication is thus that the problem of predicting F from I is equivalent to the
signal restoration problem presented in section 3. The following section illustrates this argument
by applying the analysis the Schelling model, which is known to posses the FIP.
5 Application to the Schelling model of segregation
5.1 FIP in the Schelling model of segregation
In the standard setting of the Schelling model two types of agents live in a city made up of discrete
locations, and each type has a preference for living in a local neighbourhood composed of agents
of the same type. When agents are allowed to move, segregated neighborhoods will emerge from
an integrated initial condition as agents relocate to unoccupied locations in the city that are more
attractive. The attractiveness of a location to an agent is a function of the number of similar
8 Clearly, the switching process used in the proof is simplistic: one does not expect goods to choose their owners
in order to maximise a payoff! Edgeworth trading, however, can be broken down into a sequence of such switches:





Fig. 2 Emergence of segregation in the Schelling model
agents in the vicinity, which usually determined by counting the number of similar agents within
a neighbourhood of given width. If B is a N × N binary matrix which identifies the neighbours
for all N locations, and lc is the binary vector for the location of c-type agents, this similarity for
each location i is given by:






As is the case with the work of Grauwin et al (2012), it is assumed that the space occupied by
the city is toroidal, so that the top/bottom and left/right edges are in contact. This simplification
allows the neighbourhood matrix B to be encoded as a circulant matrix, which greatly facilitates
the analysis. A further assumption used here is that the utility of an agent is directly proportional
to the number of similar neighbors. This is contrast to original Schelling (1969, 1971) model,
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where utility is a unimodal function of similarity, initially increasing with similarity, peaking for
a balanced neighbourhood composed of 50% of agents of each type, then declining as similarity
increases further. Indeed, Grauwin et al (2012) show that in the case of continuous neighborhoods
such as (10), the existence of a potential function - critical to presence of the FIP discussed in
section 4.2 - requires that utility functions be linear functions of the number of similar agents.
Because it is assumed that relocation opportunities arrive randomly (typically as a Poisson
process), simulation is usually the method of choice for investigating this model. Grauwin et al
(2012) themselves point out that most analyses of this model rely on agent-based simulations and
lack analytical solutions. Such a simulation is therefore provided as a point of reference for the
MaxEnt prediction methodology. 9
The sequence of images in Figure 2 (a)→(i) provides a time-lapse of the simulation process, and
illustrates the concept of a finite improvement path. The random initial state is given in Figure 2
(a) , while Figure 2 (i) represents the state of the city after 44841 individual moves have occurred.
The final state in 2 (i), which exhibits the segregated outcomes typical of the Schelling model, is
stable as no further utility-improving relocations exist.
5.2 MaxEnt prediction
The finite improvement path visible in Figure 2 provides a simple yet effective illustration for the
argument made in section 4.2. Indeed, viewing the finite improvement path in reverse, (i)→(a),
provides a situation where an initially well-defined and coherent image gradually picks up noise,
eventually obscuring the initial information. Thus, the problem of predicting 2 (i) from the initial
condition 2 (a) is equivalent to the problem of reconstructing a signal 2 (i) from noisy data 2 (a).
We show that predictions of the Schelling model from the initial condition can indeed be obtained
using a modified version of the MaxEnt image reconstruction approach discussed in section 3,
specifically the algorithm of Skilling and Gull (1991).
Within the setting described above in 5.1, let hci be the probability that the i
th location is
occupied by an agent of the cth colour, with c ∈ {R,G,W} and ∑c hci = 1. Given this, relative
entropy (5) measures the expected information content of a message revealing the final state of a
randomly picked location, relative to any prior information on the location of agents:










9 The parameters for the benchmark simulation are as follows: the city is 200 pixels across and each pixel represents
a location, so there are N = 2002 = 40000 locations. There are NR = NG = 16000 red and green agents and
NW = 8000 free spaces. The continuous neighborhood agents consider when assessing the desirability of a given
location is a 7× 7 square area centered on that location.
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As outlined in Section 3, relative entropy (11) encodes prior information through the underlying
model mci . In the Schelling model, however, agent satisfaction does not depend on absolute location,
but on location relative to other agents. As a result, there is no prior information regarding the
probability of a single location being occupied by a particular type of agent, and mci in expression
(11) is not particularly useful. This is dealt with by following Skilling and Gull (1987) and con-
sidering the expected information content of a message revealing the state {c, d} of two randomly
picked locations {x, y}.10 Using expression (12) enables the integration of a two-dimensional model
mc,di,j which can contain knowledge of correlations across locations.
11 This is better suited to the
prior information provided in the Schelling model, in which one expects neighbouring locations to
have a relatively high probability of being occupied by similar agents.
























The second important piece of information required for the MaxEnt prediction is the initial
condition of the system, which provides the data entering the likelihood in (6). With the reversed
FIP, where Figure 2 (i) decays to a noisy state in Figure 2 (a), this represents the information
that has not been wiped out in the decayed image. Within the Schelling setting, this intuitively
represents the key stable locations that are initially most attractive and are not modified as the
segregated outcome emerges. This information is revealed by taking the convolutions of the initial
state in order to determine the initial attractiveness (10) for each type of population, shown in
Figure 3.
As a further simplification we assume, following the standard image restoration literature,
that the divergence between the prediction hc and the initial attractiveness data dc is normally
distributed. This implies that the likelihood p(dc|hc) = exp(−`(dc|hc))/Z` is gaussian, and therefore
the log-likelihood `(dc|hc) is directly related to the chi-squared deviation between the initial data










The the information theoretic problem is therefore to maximise the ignorance of an observer
(12) subject to the information provided by the likelihood (13), normalising to ensure that the
predicted number of agents of each colour equals the initial amount N c. As pointed out by Skilling
10 The derivation of the double entropy specification is detailed in appendix A.
11 This structure also allows correlations across agent types, for example if agents were to evaluate the attractiveness
of a location not only by the number of similar agents but also by the number of agents of a different type. This is
not the case here as in the basic Schelling model, agents only consider their own type in their location decision, in
other words mc,di,j = 0 ∀d 6= c.
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(a) initial green state (b) initial green attractiveness
(c) initial red state (d) initial red attractiveness
Fig. 3 Initial condition information
and Gull (1991), the value of the implicit Lagrange parameter α is used to constrain the noise level
measured by (13) to be equal to number of degrees of freedom controlled by noise, i.e. the overall
number of locations N minus the number of good locations Γ c in the initial data.12
The first order condition of the problem directly provides the best prediction for the distribution












The effective model µci and the normalisation parameter Z

























One can see that the effective model for a location µci is simply the geometric mean of the
individual correlations mi,j , weighted by the probability vector. As pointed out by Skilling and
Gull (1987), this is effectively a convolution of the reconstruction hc with the logarithm of the
N × N model matrix, similar to (10). 13 It is important to point out that expression (14) only
12 The relation between α and the number of noisy degrees of freedom as well as the calculation of Γ c are explained
in appendix B.
13 In practice the convolution used in the prediction algorithm is different: instead of calculating hdj lnm
c,d
i,j the
algorithm uses mc,di,j lnh
d
j . This is done for computational reasons. Most of the entries in the model M are vanishingly
small as one expects the correlations across locations to exist only over short distances. As a result they are truncated
17
(a) Final green state (b) Monte Carlo green fre-
quency
(c) MaxEnt Green probability
density
(d) Final red state (e) Monte Carlo red frequency (f) MaxEnt Red probability
density
Fig. 4 MaxEnt predictions vs. Monte Carlo frequencies
provides an implicit solution for the probability distribution hci as both the model term µ
c
i and
noise term χ2(hc) are themselves functions of hci . The predicted distributions are therefore obtained
using a gradient-based algorithm, outlined in appendix B.
A Monte-Carlo (MC) analysis was carried out in addition to the MaxEnt reconstruction in
order to assess the predictive power of the proposed methodology. Colour-specific frequencies f c
were obtained by running 1000 Monte-Carlo (MC) iterations of the Schelling model on the same
initial condition. Intuitively, f ci indicates the percentage of simulations that resulted in the i
th
location being occupied by an c-coloured agent, and these can directly be compared to hci , the
probability that location i is of colour c in the MaxEnt reconstruction. Figures 4 (a) and (d) are
the colour-specific results of the simulation shown in Figure 2, while figures 4 (c) and (f) provide
the MaxEnt prediction (14) given the information from the initial condition in Figure 3. The MC
frequencies f c are shown in Figures 4 (b) and (e).
Table 4 provides two main measures of goodness of fit for the reconstruction hc compared to
the MC frequencies f c for both types of agents. The first is the Spearman rank correlation between
the two vectors, which is large and highly significant. A second measure is the relative mean square
error (MSE) of hc as a predictor of f c , which is calculated as the sum of squared deviations between
out of the matrix, which can be stored efficiently as a sparse matrix with many zero elements. Taking the logarithm
of this sparse matrix thus becomes problematic, therefore in practice it is easier to take the logarithm of the hc.
18
Table 4 Goodness of fit tests, Monte Carlo vs. MaxEnt
Spearman’s ρ p-value MSE/σ2 Standardised MSE/σ2
Green 0.910 0 0.9879 0.2292
Red 0.8190 0 0.9888 0.4546
the hc and f c relative to the variance of the MC frequency f c, i.e. (f−h)′(f−h)[(f− f¯)′(f− f¯)]−1.
The MSE values just below unity suggests that hc is a better predictor of f c than the expectation
f¯ c = h¯c = NC/N , but only by a small margin. This is because in practice the reconstruction hc
is very flat, with a standard deviations of 0.0023 and 0.0026 for the greens and reds respectively,
which means that hc never moves very far from its expected value h¯c = NC/N . Intuitively, there is
so much noise in the initial information of Figure 3, as measured by the chi-squared deviation (13),
that the degrees of freedom available for the description of the reconstructed image (14), measured
by Γ c = N − χ2 (hc), are severely limited.
Once the relative flatness of the reconstruction is controlled for by standardising both vectors
hc and f c, the MSE measure falls significantly, which is shown in the final column of Table 4.
This standardised MSE supports the good predictive power of hc with regards to the location of
red/green agents, which is what is revealed by visual comparison in Figure 4. One can conclude
from this that although the initial information in Figure 3 is very noisy and therefore seems of
limited use, and even though the power of the MaxEnt methodology is limited in terms of predicting
the amplitude of the absolute frequencies f c, it nevertheless provides a reliable prediction for the
relative locations of the two sets of agents.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The formal justification provided for transposing the signal restoration interpretation of MaxEnt
into economics is the structural similarity between object allocation problems, as modeled by the
MMKP, and congestion games frameworks. In fact, the only requirement for the optimal MMKP
allocation to also be a Nash equilibrium in a corresponding congestion game is concavity in the
bundle rankings, allowing the MMKP objective function to become an exact potential for the game.
Assuming this is the case, the system displays the FIP, i.e. from any initial state there exists a
finite path to a Nash equilibrium under even the simplest adjustment dynamics. It is the presence
of the FIP and the corresponding improvement path that then provides the key motivation for the
use of the MaxEnt signal restoration methodology in such a system. Indeed, the sequence of states
forming the improvement path can be interpreted in two ways, depending the direction in which
it is viewed.
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If the improvement path is viewed forward, starting at the initial state and finishing at the
equilibrium, the picture one has is of a system that gradually self-organises as agents perform
systematic welfare-increasing trades. This corresponds to the self-organisation concept mentioned
in introduction and, as illustrated with Figure 2, this interpretation corresponds to the biological
entropy reduction insight of Schro¨dinger (1967): the amount of information required to describe
the state of the overall system falls over time as it organises itself. If, however, the same improve-
ment path is played backwards, i.e. starting at the equilibrium and traveling back towards the
initial condition, then a physical analogy is more appropriate. Agents now appear to be making
systematic welfare-decreasing trades, in other words systematic errors. With this reverse view,
the initially ordered state gradually decays as noise is introduced. This corresponds to the direct
physical interpretation of entropy increases: An initially ordered system, say an ice cube in a glass
of water, which gradually decays into a disordered thermal equilibrium. In this case the increas-
ing information entropy measures ignorance as to the amount and type of noise that has been
introduced.
The central finding is therefore that if a system possesses the FIP, then predicting its equilibrium
distribution from a known initial state is formally equivalent to reconstructing an unobserved clean
signal out of an observed noisy one. This is illustrated by the application to the Schelling model,
where such an algorithm is shown to be able to predict the emergence and location of segregated
neighbourhoods with a good level of accuracy. Not only does this provide a stronger justification
for the use of MaxEnt and information-theoretic methods in economics, but it also suggests that
signal reconstruction algorithms, designed specifically for the purpose of recovering a degraded
signal, could become useful tools in agent-based computational economics. As pointed out by
Fagiolo et al (2007) as part of a special issue of Computational Economics the empirical validation
in agent-based models is still an open question, and the methodology outlined here might be helpful
in that regard.
There are two important considerations going forwards, however. The first is that the use
of the FIP as a formal definition of self-organisation is probably too strong. The FIP implies
both systematic improvements in transitions and a finite horizon, i.e. the existence of a stable
final state. While this helps to underpin the use of MaxEnt, it is easy to imagine richer self-
organising systems where neither holds, for example if forward-looking agents accept short run
welfare reductions in order to benefit in the longer run or simply if agents occasionally make
mistakes. It is therefore interesting to examine the performance of signal reconstruction methods in
such weaker environments. A second consideration is that the MaxEnt algorithm is chosen because
versions of it have already been used in economics, and because it offers an intuitive illustration of
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the arrow-of-time interpretation of the mechanism. However, while it seems to perform adequately
in the case presented here, it is only one of many available signal reconstruction algorithms, and
may not be the most powerful or the most adapted to the specific economic case.
Acknowledgements The author wishes to acknowledge the suggestions received at the ESHIA 2011 and CEF
2012 conferences, as well as thank the GREQAM seminar participants for suggesting the Schelling application for
the MaxEnt methodology. Particular thanks goes to Jagjit Chadha, Alan Kirman, Mishael Milakovic´, Lionel Nesta
and Alexis Akira Toda for their helpful advice, and especially to Sonia Moulet for tirelessly providing a sounding
board for the author’s ideas. Any errors are the author’s.
References
Alfarano S, Milakovic´ M (2008) Does classical competition explain the statistical features of firm
growth? Economics Letters 101:272–274
Castaldi C, Milakovic´ M (2007) Turnover activity in wealth portfolios. Journal of Economic Be-
havior and Organization 63:537–552
Cover TM, Thomas JA (1991) Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley & Sons
Dowsland KA, Thompson JM (2000) Solving a nurse scheduling problem with knapsacks, networks
and tabu search. Journal of the Operational Research Society 51:825–833
Fagiolo G, Moneta A, Windrum P (2007) A critical guide to empirical validation of agent-based
models in economics: Methodologies, procedures, and open problems. Computational Economics
30:195–226
Foley DK (1994) A statistical equilibrium theory of markets. Journal of Economic Theory 62:321–
345
Grauwin S, Goffette-Nagot F, Jensen P (2012) Dynamic models of residential segregation: An
analytical solution. Journal of Public Economics 96:124–141
Harris M, Raviv A (1981) Allocation mechanisms and the design of auctions. Econometrica
49:1477–1499
Hayek F (1945) The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review 35:519–530
Hifi M, Michrafy M, Sbihi A (2004) Heuristic algorithms for the multiple-choice multidimensional
knapsack problem. Journal of the Operational Research Society 55:1323–1332
Hurwicz L (1973) The design of mechanisms for resource allocation. American Economic Review
63:1–30
Jaynes ET (1957) Information theory and statistical mechanics i. The Physical Review 106:620–630
21
Khan S, Li KF, Manning EG, Akbar M (2002) Solving the knapsack problem for adaptive media
systems. Studia Informatica 2:161–182
Marks RE (2007) Validating simulation models: A general framework and four applied examples.
Computational Economics 30:265–290
Monderer D, Shapely LS (1996) Potential games. Games and Economic Behaviour 14:124–143
Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Mathematics Of Operations Research 6:58–73
Ng YK (1975) Bentham or bergson? finite sensibility, utility functions and social welfare functions.
The Review of Economic Studies 42:545–569
Rosenthal RW (1973) A class of games possesing pure-strategy nash equilibria. International Jour-
nal of Game Theory 2:65–67
Sbihi A (2007) A best first search exact algorithm for the multiple-choice multidimensional knap-
sack problem. Journal of Combinatorial Optimisation 13:337–351
Schelling TC (1969) Models of segregation. American Economic Review 59:488–493
Schelling TC (1971) Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1:143–186
Schro¨dinger E (1967) What Is Life? with Mind and Matter and Autobiographical Sketches, Cam-
bridge University Press, chap What Is Life?
Shannon CE (1948) A mathematical theory of communication. The Bell System Technical Journal
27:379–423
Shore JE, Johnson R (1980) Axiomatic derivation of the principle of maximum entropy and the
principle of minimum cross-entropy. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 26:26–37
Skilling J, Gull SF (1987) Maximum-Entropy and Bayesian spectral analysis and estimation prob-
lems, Kluwer, chap Prior knowledge must be used
Skilling J, Gull SF (1991) Bayesian maximum-entropy image reconstruction. Spatial Statistics and
Imaging 20:341–367
Tesfatsion L (2006) Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol. 2: Agent-Based Computational
Economics, North-Holland, chap Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive Ap-
proach to Economic Theory, pp 831–880
Toda AA (2010) Existence of a statistical equilibrium for an economy with endogenous offer sets.
Economic Theory 45:379–415
Vinkovic D, Kirman A (2006) A physical analogue of the Schelling model. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 103:19,261–19,265
22
A Information-theoretic framework
The key difference between the standard relative information content (11) typically used in the image processing
literature and the specification (12) used here is the use of the double space entropy suggested by Skilling and Gull
(1987) to integrate prior knowledge of relative rather than absolute positions of agents. Formally, the relative entropy
is the same as (11), except that it encodes the information content of a message revealing the colours {c, d} of a
randomly chosen pair of locations {x, y}, relative to what would be expected given prior knowledge of correlations
mx,y :

















































j , one obtains the specification used in equation (12). Although the existence
correlations in the model mc,di,j means that the probabilities are not in fact independent, this assumption allows the
relative entropy to measure the extra information required to treat probabilities hci and h
d
j as independent when
they are in fact related by the underlying model.
Given the specifications for the entropy (12) and the the likelihood (13), maximising the posterior distribution
involves solving the following maximum entropy problem. It is assumed that the αc parameter integrates the









This leads to the following first order condition with respect to hci :














Because Nc, the total number of agents of a particular colour, is given in the initial condition and does not

















B Maximum entropy algorithm
The algorithm used to obtain the probability distribution (14) follows from Skilling and Gull (1991).14 The initial
probability and model vectors are given by the uniform distribution hci = m
c
i = N
c/N . Prior to running the algo-
rithm, the initial conditions are processed in order to extract the relevant data for calibrating the model constraints:
14 The code for the Schelling simulation and the MaxEnt reconstruction algorithm is available from the author on
request, as well as the initial condition matrix required for replicating the figures shown here.
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– The initial attractiveness data vector dc is calculated as a convolution of initial state vector lc0, i.e. d
c = B× lc0.
– The initially most attractive locations G are determined as those where dci ≷ dc ± 2σc. Because these good
locations are clustered, the number of distinct clusters Γ c is obtained by convolving the initial attractive locations
G with B a second time to identify those which most attractive because located closest to each other. This
provides ΓR = 14 and ΓG = 11.
– Finally the expected radius of a cluster b =
√
G/(Γ c ∗ pi) is calculated. This is used to calibrate the model Mc,
which is assumed to be a circulant matrix containing a gaussian convolution of standard deviation b.
B.1 Newton method iteration
The iterative algorithm uses the Newton method to find the most probable reconstruction h. In terms of notation,
assuming that v is a N × 1 column vector, [v] refers to a N × N diagonal matrix with the entries of v on the
main diagonal and zeros off the main diagonal. Referring to Qc as the argument of the maximisation in (A-3), the
Jacobian vector and Hessian matrix are given by:
∇Qc = αc∇S (hx, hy |mx,y)−∇` (dc|hc)∇∇Qc = αc∇∇S (hx, hy |mx,y)−∇∇` (dc|hc) (A-7)
The step change in the probability vector at each iteration can be calculated using the standard Newton method:
∆hc = − (∇∇Qc)−1 .∇Qc (A-8)
Given that the Hessian matrix ∇∇Qc is symmetric by construction, calculation of the iteration step (A-8) can be
carried out efficiently by using the Preconditioned Conjugate Gradient method (PCG) to solve −∇∇Qc.∆hc = ∇Qc
without inverting the Hessian ∇∇Qc. Once this is done, the prediction is updated: hc + ∆hc. The model is also
updated at this point using ∆µc = [µc] [hc]−1Mc∆hc.
B.2 Control and termination
Two related control issues must be solved as the Newton iterations proceed. First of all, the value of the αc
parameter has to be determined and adjusted, and secondly the iteration must be terminated at some point. The
main advantage of the Skilling and Gull (1991) approach is that it is the optimal value of αc which both controls
the iteration process and provides this termination condition. By integrating αc into the hypothesis space of the
Bayesian problem, they show that the most probable αˆc satisfies:
−2αcS (hx, hy |mx,y) = tr
(
(αcI + Lc)−1 Lc
)
where αcI + Lc = [hc]
1
2 ∇∇Qc [hc] 12 (A-9)
If λci are the eigenvalues of L
c, then tr
(







c + λci ). The trace term is therefore a
measure of the number of good observations in the data, i.e. the number of dimensions for which λci >> α
c, and
the role of αc is to identify the number of good observations and hence the amount of noise, as −2αcS + χ2 = N .
If r is a N × 1 vector of N(0, 1) errors, then the trace term can be estimated by:
tr
(










This implies that the tr
(
(αcI + Lc)−1 Lc
)
term can be calculated by using PCG to solve∇∇Qc.Y = [hc]− 12 Lcr,
then calculating r′ [hc]−
1
2 Y . Given the similarity of (A-10) and the step-size problem (A-8), this is carried out in par-
allel to the main iteration at very little extra cost. This provides control by providing a target value α˜c = −trace/(2S)
towards which the αc parameter can be adjusted at each iteration.
In the original Skilling and Gull (1991) algorithm, equation (A-9) also provides the following termination con-




(αcI + Lc)−1 Lc
)
2αcS (hx, hy |mx,y)
(A-11)
Given that the number of distinct good locations Γ c is known in advance, (A-9) and (A-11) are modified to take
this into account, by rescaling αc with a free parameter θ, shown below. This parameter ensures that when the Ω ≈ 1
termination condition is reached αˆc = α˜c. More importantly, it also ensures 2(αˆcθ)S = tr((αˆcI + Lc)−1Lc) = Γ c
and χ2(hˆc) = N − Γ c.
θ = −2α
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(αcI + Lc)−1 Lc
)
2αcS (hx, hy |mx,y)
(A-14)
